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The Plaintiff/Respondent, Truck Insurance Exchange 
("TIE"), through its attorneys of record, respectfully submits this 
brief opposing the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by the 
Defendant/Petitioner, Motor Cargo ("Motor Cargo"). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The questions presented for review are as stated by Motor 
Cargo in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari (the "Petition"). 
OPINION ISSUED BY COURT OF APPEALS 
On July 30, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its 
decision affirming the judgment of the Second Judicial District 
Court for Davis County, State of Utah, in favor of TIE and against 
Motor Cargo. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
TIE adopts the Statement of Jurisdiction as set forth in 
Motor Cargo's Petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
TIE adopts the statement of the case as set forth in 
Motor Cargo's Petition with the following additions: 
On February 25, 1987, the trial court entered an Order 
and Judgment1 in which it: (a) granted TIE'S Motion for Summary 
Judgment on its First Cause of Action; (b) denied TIE'S Motion 
for Summary Judgment on its Second Cause of Action; (c) denied 
Motor Cargo's Motion for Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim; 
1
 A copy of the Order and Judgment is included in the 
Appendix to this Brief as "Part B." 
tie\mc-brief •*• 
(d) granted Motor Cargo leave to amend its Counterclaim to add 
claims for trade libel and interference with contract and business 
advantage; (e) granted TIE'S Motion to Strike the Affidavit of 
William K. Maxwell dated July 15, 1986, the only affidavit filed by 
Motor Cargo in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, as to 
those provisions of Paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 7 thereof which contain 
hearsay and opinions of William K. Maxwell and James Keddington; 
and (f) stayed execution on the Judgment until all remaining 
claims asserted by the parties were adjudicated. (Emphasis added) 
Thereafter, in accordance with the parties' Stipulation2 
dated December 16, 1987, the issues not resolved by the Order and 
Judgment were submitted to the court for trial pursuant to the 
provisions of Rule 39(b) and Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure based upon the pleadings, stipulated facts, motions, 
affidavits and memoranda of the parties, excepting Motor Cargo's 
claims in its Amended Counterclaim for trade libel and interference 
with contract and business advantage which were severed for trial 
at a later date. Following the trial court's issuance of its 
Memorandum Decision granting judgment in favor of TIE, TIE served 
interrogatories and requests for admissions on Motor Cargo 
regarding its trade libel and contract interference 
2
 This Stipulation, as noted in Motor Cargo's Petition on 
page 9, for unknown reasons, is not part of the record below. It 
is referred to in the trial court's Memorandum Decision. A copy of 
the Stipulation, without the exhibits, was included in the Addendum 
to TIE'S Brief filed with the Utah Court of Appeals and is also 
included in the Appendix to this Brief as "Part E." 
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claims. Shortly thereafter, Motor Cargo proposed that those claims 
be dismissed and an Order of Dismissal was entered based upon the 
parties' stipulation. The trial court then entered its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and the final Judgment appealed from by 
Motor Cargo. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
TIE adopts Motor Cargo's Statement of Facts with the 
following additions, modifications and objections: 
A. ADDITIONS AND MODIFICATIONS: 
1. TIE and Motor Cargo entered into preliminary 
discussions and negotiations regarding the Retrospective Premium 
Determination Agreement-Plan III ("Retro Agreement") during which 
TIE'S representative explained its contents, and in particular, how 
the cancellation provisions of Paragraph 16 would be applied. (R. 
229-230) 
2. Before the Retro Agreement was signed by Motor 
Cargo's representative, TIE'S representative specifically explained 
to him that retrospective rating was a method of determining, in 
retrospect, what the final earned premium for the policy of 
insurance would be for the agreed three-year term; that all interim 
refunds and premium adjustments were subject to a final adjustment 
and settlement at the end of the three-year term; and that if the 
Retro Agreement were terminated early the provisions of 
Paragraph 16 would apply and Motor Cargo would lose the benefits of 
retrospective rating. (R. 229-230) 
3 
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3. Retrospective rating is designed to provide benefits 
and potential savings to an insured with a good loss experience 
record over the agreed three-year term of the Retro Agreement. (R. 
224-25, 336, 391) 
4. Premiums determined by using retrospective rating 
under a Retro Agreement benefit the insured by providing the option 
of partial self insurance and broader insurance coverage at a 
substantially reduced cost compared to the premium for similar 
coverage under a standard one-year policy. Id. 
5. Motor Cargo cancelled Retro Agreement B at the end 
of the first year of the three-year term. (R. 15, 392) 
6. Paragraph 16 of Retro Agreement B3 provides for 
cancellation by either party, and with respect to early 
cancellation by the insured, Motor Cargo, provides, in part: 
CANCELLATION. This agreement may be cancelled 
by the Insured, or by the Exchange, at any 
time, by giving thirty days (30) advance 
written notice to the other party. . . . The 
premium for a cancellation prior to the end of 
the term of this agreement shall be computed 
in accordance with the other provisions of 
this agreement, subject to the following 
additional provisions. 
(a) Cancellation by the named Insured: 
In the event of cancellation by the named 
insured for any other reason, the minimum 
earned premium shall be 110% of the 
Retrospective or Basic Premium, whichever is 
the greater, but the amount so calculated 
3
 A copy of Retro Agreement B is included in the Appendix 
to this Brief as "Part F." 
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shall not exceed the Standard Premium as 
defined in this agreement; provided, however, 
that if the insured orders cancellation of 
this agreement within sixty days following the 
effective date of any rate increase in any of 
the policies of insurance applicable to this 
agreement, or the business entity is 
dissolved, the earned premium shall be the 
Retrospective Premium. 
(R. 14) 
7. Following the cancellation of Retro Agreement B by 
Motor Cargo and after making the various accounting adjustments 
specified therein and issuing interim reports, TIE sent Motor Cargo 
its final invoice dated March 31, 1986, showing a premium due of 
$68,394.00, which reflects all premium adjustments and credits and 
supersedes all interim adjustments and reports made under Retro 
Agreement B. (R. 153, 392-93) 
8. For purposes of this Court's consideration of Motor 
Cargo's Petition, the following Findings of Fact are material, in 
addition to those identified in Paragraph 22 of Motor Cargo's 
Statement of Facts: 
8. The Retro Agreements and the Policy are 
somewhat unique to TIE and allowed Motor Cargo a 
much broader insurance coverage at substantial 
savings over a standard or fixed-rate policy 
conditional upon Motor Cargo's loss history and the 
extent to which Motor Cargo is determined to be 
self insuring. 
9. Retrospective rating under the Retro 
Agreements provides a method of determining, in 
tie\mc-brief 5 
retrospect, what the final earned premium for the 
Policy will be for the agreed term of the Policy. 
12. The benefits and potential savings to the 
insured are dependent upon the insured's loss 
experience over the agreed term, as retrospective 
rating is designed to recognize the merits of each 
individual risk based upon the loss experience of 
the insured. . . . (emphasis added) 
13. A substantial part of the consideration 
to TIE in entering into the Retro Agreements with 
Motor Cargo was the agreement of Motor Cargo to 
continue insurance coverage in force for the 
specified term of three (3) years rather than the 
one-year term of a standard policy. (R. 390-391) 
B. OBJECTIONS: 
TIE objects to Paragraph 11 of Motor Cargo's Statement of 
Facts and asserts that the following statements accurately reflect 
the facts shown in the Record below.4: 
9. William K. Maxwell (Maxwell) never was an agent of 
TIE at any time prior to Motor Cargo's cancellation of Retro 
Agreement B, as Retro Agreement B was cancelled effective February 
28, 1983, and Maxwell first became an agent for TIE in December, 
1984, 22 months later. (R. 175, 392; Appendix - Part I) 
10. Maxwell's discussions with an officer of Motor Cargo 
regarding Maxwell's opinion of the consequences to Motor Cargo of 
4
 Paragraph 11 of Motor Cargo's Statement of Facts is 
highly misleading as it erroneously states or implies that William 
K. Maxwell was a former insurance agent of TIE when he met with 
Motor Cargo's officer to discuss the early cancellation provisions 
and that this discussion occurred before Motor Cargo signed Retro 
Agreement B. This matter is referred to in additional detail on 
pages 11 through 13 of this brief. 
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early cancellation did not occur until February, 1983, the first 
time Maxwell had thoroughly reviewed and studied a Retro Agreement, 
and eleven months after Retro Agreement B had been signed, (R. 
216; Appendix - Part I) 
11. In February, 1983, Maxwell was employed by Transport 
Insurance, a competitor of TIE, who was attempting to get the 
insurance business of Motor Cargo that was then being handled by 
TIE. (Id.) (All emphasis added) 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY APPLIED THE RULES OF 
CONSTRUCTION IN INTERPRETING RETRO AGREEMENT B. 
A, The doctrine of strict construction of an insurance 
policy against the drafter does not apply in this 
case. 
Motor Cargo erroneously contends that because the Court 
of Appeals determined an ambiguity exists in Retro Agreement B, it 
failed to construe that ambiguity against TIE. While application 
of the doctrine of strict construction of an insurance policy 
against its drafter is appropriate under certain circumstances, the 
facts do not warrant its application in this case. The cases cited 
in Motor Cargo's Petition, LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Insurance 
Company, 765 P.2d 857, 858-59. (Utah 1988) and Metropolitan 
Property & Liability v. Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254, (Utah App. 1988),5 
5
 The Utah Court of Appeals later vacated its opinion in 
this case. See Metropolitan Property & Liability v. Finlayson, 766 
P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1989). 
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involve facts and issues significantly different from those of this 
case. LPS Hospital involves the resolution of an ambiguity in the 
coverage provisions of an insurance policy purchased by an 
individual and holds that any ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
language of an insurance policy is to be resolved in favor of 
coverage and against the drafter of the policy in order to afford 
the insured the protection he or she sought to obtain by paying 
premiums. 
Retro Agreement B is not a "policy of insurance" in the 
context of LPS Hospital or other similar cases applying the rule of 
strict construction urged by Motor Cargo. That is, it is not the 
instrument whereby one contractor transfers a risk to another 
contractor who agrees to assume the risk for a consideration. See 
Couch on Insurance 2d §§ 1:1-4 (1959). Rather, Retro Agreement B 
is a separate agreement, the sole purpose of which is to provide 
the method of determining the premium to be paid. It contains no 
provisions relating to coverage. To refer to Retro Agreement B as 
an "insurance contract" as Motor Cargo has done in its Petition is 
erroneous. 
The doctrine of strict construction of insurance policies 
against the insurer recognizes that parties to routine kinds of 
insurance policies ordinarily do not discuss or negotiate their 
terms and provisions, and that parties to insurance contracts 
usually have disparate bargaining positions. These factors are not 
present here. Retro Agreement B is an agreement between two large 
p 
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commercial entities and the undisputed facts show that 
representatives of Motor Cargo and TIE entered into preliminary 
discussions and negotiations before Retro Agreement B was executed. 
In his affidavit,6 Wendell Wells, TIE'S representative in those 
discussions and negotiations states, in part: 
4. On behalf of TIE, I entered into 
preliminary discussions with representatives 
of Motor Cargo regarding the execution of the 
Retro Agreement. I explained the contents of 
the Retro Agreement to the defendant's 
representatives and in particular how the 
cancellation provisions of the Retro Agreement 
in Paragraph 16 would be applied. 
6. Before the Retro Agreement was 
executed by Motor Cargo, I explained to Mr. 
Ranck, [Motor Cargo's President], among other 
things, that retrospective rating was a method 
of determining, in retrospect, what the final 
earned premium for a policy of insurance would 
be for the agreed three-year term of the 
policy, and that all interim refunds and 
premium adjustments were subject to a final 
adjustment and settlement at the end of the 
agreed three-year term of the Retro Agreement. 
I also explained to them that if the 
agreements were terminated by Motor Cargo 
before the end of the three-year term, that 
the provisions of Paragraph 16 of the Retro 
Agreement would apply and that the premium 
then due would be the greater of the 
retrospective or basic premium computed under 
the terms of the policy plus a ten percent 
(10%) short-range cancellation charge, and 
that Motor Cargo would lose the benefits of 
6
 A copy of Wendell Wells' affidavit (without exhibits) is 
included in the Appendix to this Brief as "Part G." Motor Cargo 
filed no affidavit opposing or refuting Wendell Wells' Affidavit. 
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retrospective rating, (R. 229-230) (Emphasis 
added) 
In any event, the doctrine of strict construction is not 
a trump card that may be played at any time an ambiguity in a 
contract exists. Rather, it is applied by the courts as a last 
resort. In Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 582, 585 
(Utah App. 1988), the Court of Appeals explains the proper 
application of this rule: 
Plaintiff misapprehends the doctrine that 
contracts should be construed against the 
drafter. [footnote omitted] The doctrine 
does not operate in dispositive fashion simply 
because ambiguity has been found. Once a 
contract is deemed ambiguous, the next order 
of business is to admit extrinsic evidence to 
aid in the interpretation of the contract. It 
is only after extrinsic evidence is considered 
and the Court is still uncertain as to the 
intention of the parties that ambiguities 
should be construed against the drafter, 
[footnote omitted] (Emphasis added) 
In a footnote, the Court of Appeals acknowledges that insurance 
contracts could be an exception to the above rule, but explains 
this result as stemming from the fact that insurance contracts are 
ordinarily not preceded by discussions of specific terms or by 
negotiations. 
B. Consideration of Extrinsic Evidence to Interpret Retro 
Agreement B is Proper 
As stated in Wilburn. supra, when a court determines 
that a contract is ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence regarding the 
intentions of the parties should be received and considered as the 
next step to aid in the interpretation of the contract. See also 
tie\mc-brief * ^ 
Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356 (Utah 1989) and Kimball v. 
Campbell. 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985)- In Hibdon v. Truck 
Insurance Exchange, 657 P.2d 1358, 1359 (Utah 1983), a case 
involving the interpretation of an insurance binder, this Court 
observed that if ambiguity had been found in the language of the 
insurance binder, the "ambiguity would permit parol evidence to be 
admitted as to the intentions of the parties in using the language 
which they employed" and cites several other cases in which other 
courts have affirmed the use of extrinsic evidence in interpreting 
ambiguous terms of insurance contracts. See also Garcia v. Truck 
Insurance Exchange, 682 P.2d 1100, 1105 (Cal. 1984). Thus, the 
Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court did not 
err in admitting extrinsic evidence in this case and that its 
finding of fact under the standard of review in Kimball, supra, 
should not be disturbed. 
II- THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE ADMISSIBLE 
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT THE PARTIES DISCUSSED THE 
PROVISIONS OF RETRO AGREEMENT B AND THAT MOTOR CARGO KNEW THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF ITS EARLY CANCELLATION. 
It is significant that Motor Cargo not only offered no 
affidavit in opposition to the affidavit of Wendell Wells referred 
to on pages 9 and 10 of this Brief, but offered no extrinsic 
evidence of its contractual intent. The sole affidavit submitted 
tie\mc-brief 11 
by it was that of William K. Maxwell (the "Maxwell Affidavit").7 
Based upon TIE'S Motion to Strike, the trial court ordered 
Paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Maxwell Affidavit stricken to the 
extent they contain hearsay and the opinions of Maxwell and of a 
James Keddington, This order has never been challenged by Motor 
Cargo.8 The remaining relevant portions of the Maxwell Affidavit 
are refuted or discredited by Maxwell's own supplemental affidavit 
filed at a later date (the "Supplemental Affidavit").9 
Nevertheless, Motor Cargo persists here, as it did before the Court 
of Appeals, in its efforts to resurrect the stricken paragraphs of 
the Maxwell Affidavit, apparently failing to recognize or 
acknowledge that the affidavit provides Motor Cargo with no help on 
the issue of the parties' contractual intentions. The Maxwell 
Affidavit relates to Maxwell's opinion regarding his interpretation 
of the Retro Agreement reached after the agreement was signed and 
does not purport to relate to Motor Cargo's contractual intent. 
Therefore, even were they admissible, the opinions of Maxwell and 
Keddington regarding their interpretation of the cancellation 
provisions of Retro Agreement B are simply not relevant or material 
to Motor Cargo's contractual intent. In his Supplemental 
7
 A copy of the Maxwell Affidavit is included in the 
Appendix to this Brief as "Part H." 
8
 See Paragraph 4 of the Order and Judgment included as 
"Part B" of the Appendix to this Brief. 
9
 A copy of Maxwell's Supplemental Affidavit is included as 
"Part I" of the Appendix to this Brief. 
12 
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Affidavit, Maxwell admits that he first examined Retro Agreement B 
and formulated his opinion in February, 1983, approximately twelve 
months after the agreement was signed. He also admits that he 
was then employed by a competitor of TIE who was seeking to get 
Motor Cargo's insurance business. These admissions provided the 
trial court with ample reason to disregard his original affidavit 
in its entirety.10 
Motor Cargo's argument that the evidence does not show it 
knew it would lose "excess" premium payments in the event of early 
cancellation is specious and should be rejected by this Court. It 
was apparent to the trial court, and the Court of Appeals, as it 
should be to Motor Cargo's counsel, that the benefit of 
retrospective rating is the potential of achieving lower premiums 
based upon an insured's loss experience. This was the obvious 
benefit sought by Motor Cargo in entering into Retro Agreement B. 
So-called "excess premiums" cannot exist unless the retrospective 
rating formula, applied to the insured's loss experience, results 
in a premium which is lower than the basic monthly premium paid, as 
specified in the Retro Agreement. Thus, contrary to Motor Cargo's 
10
 The Maxwell Affidavit is fatally defective for the 
additional reason that it fails to state that it is based upon 
Maxwell's personal knowledge and information. Treloggan v. 
Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985). 
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assertion, the loss of the benefit of retrospective rating 
necessarily equates with the loss of any excess premium.11 
The extrinsic evidence and the reasonable inferences 
which may be drawn therefrom provide a sufficient basis for the 
trial court's finding that before the parties entered into Retro 
Agreement B, TIE specifically explained the cancellation provisions 
of Paragraph 16 to Motor Cargo, including the fact that the 
benefits of retrospective rating would be lost if Motor Cargo 
cancelled early. This evidence also provides a sufficient basis 
for the inference and conclusion that Motor Cargo knew any excess 
premiums would be lost. Because the trial court's findings are 
based upon the unopposed and unrefuted affidavit submitted by 
TIE,12 there is no basis in the record for the Court of Appeals to 
have made a determination that the findings were clearly erroneous. 
Motor Cargo did not and, indeed, cannot demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support those findings and the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. See Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896, 897. Significantly, Motor Cargo 
offered no evidence in support of its contention that it did not 
know or understand the consequences of early cancellation. 
11
 Without retrospective rating, there simply would be no 
method of calculating whether an excess premium exists in the 
contxt of Paragraph 13 of the Retro Agreeemnt, the paragraph relied 
upon by Motor Cargo. Obviously, if the calculation cannot be made, 
the refund provisions of that paragraph cannot be implemented. 
12
 See Affidavit of Wendell Wells, Appendix, "Part G" and 
footnote 6 on page 8 of this Brief. 
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cancellation. Moreover, Motor Cargo failed to object to the entry 
of the trial court's findings on that issue and failed to move to 
amend or make additional findings. In view of the foregoing, Motor 
Cargo is precluded at this stage of the proceedings from attacking 
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings. Fitzgerald v. Corbet. supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals followed and applied well accepted 
and established principles of law in affirming the judgment of the 
trial court. Motor Cargo has failed to demonstrate that any 
special or important reason exists, within the meaning of Rule 46 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, why this Court should 
grant a writ of certiorari. TIE, therefore, respectfully requests 
that Motor Cargo's Petition be denied. 
this tf^ day of October, 1990 DATED 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C. 
Harold C. Verhaaren 
Mark F. Bell 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 260 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 4^4-6161 
)LD C. VERHAAREN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
tie\mc-brief 15 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 5 ^ * day of October, 1990, four 
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tie\mc-brief 16 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Truck Insurance Exchange, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Motor Cargo, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 890180-CA 
F I L E D 
JUL 30J290 
Second District, Davis County 
The Honorable Rodney S. Page 
Attorneys: Jay D. Gurmankin, Mark Y. Hirata, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
Harold C. Verhaaren, Mark F. Bell, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Davidson, Billings, and Greenwood. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Appellee Truck Insurance Exchange (TIE) filed a complaint 
against Appellant Motor Cargo for breach of an insurance policy 
and a retrospective premium determination agreement. The trial 
court found that Motor Cargo is indebted to TIE for insurance 
coverage in the principal sum of $68,394, plus accruing 
interest. We affirm. 
This controversy focuses on a three-year retrospective 
premium determination agreement entered into by the parties. 
Motor Cargo, which exercised its right to terminate the agreement 
after one year, claims that it is only subject under the 
agreement to a ten percent cancellation penalty. Under a 
different interpretation, TIE claims that Motor Cargo is liable 
for a ten percent penalty in the amount of $13,960 and that this 
penalty prevents Motor Cargo from recovering $56,931 in 
retrospective excess premiums, resulting in an actual total 
penalty of fifty-one percent. 
APPENDIX - Part A 
Two of the agreement's pertinent provisions directly 
conflict with one another. Paragraph 13 provides for the refund 
of excess retrospective premiums, following the computation of 
the retrospective premiums at specified time intervals. 
Paragraph 16, on the other hand, provides that "[t]he premium for 
a cancellation prior to the end of the term of this agreement 
shall be computed in accordance with the other provisions of this 
agreement, subject to the following additional provisions." 
(Emphasis added.) The operative additional provision in 
Paragraph 16 reads "the minimum earned premium shall be 110% of 
the Retrospective or Basic Premium, whichever is the greater, but 
the amount so calculated shall not exceed the Standard Premium as 
defined in this agreement. . . .M The trial court determined 
that since the basic premium was higher than the retrospective 
premium, Motor Cargo was not entitled to the excess premiums. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that M[i]n contract 
actions, we defer to the trial judge on issues of fact, but not 
on issues of law." 50 W. Broadway Assoc, v. Redevelopment Agency 
of Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989). The supreme 
court's standard of review of a trial court's interpretation of a 
contract is that: 
A contract's interpretation may be 
either a question of law, determined by 
the words of the agreement, or a question 
of fact, determined by extrinsic evidence 
of intent. If a trial court interprets a 
contract as a matter of law, we accord its 
construction no particular weight, 
reviewing its action under a correctness 
standard. However, if the contract is not 
an integration or is ambiguous and the 
trial court proceeds to find facts 
respecting the intentions of the parties 
based on extrinsic evidence, then our 
review is strictly limited. 
Id. (quoting Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985)). 
This court has stated that H[i]n the first instance, the 
determination of whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a 
question of law.- Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v, Reichert, 784 
P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "Where questions arise in 
the interpretation of an agreement, the first source of inquiry is 
within the document itself. It should be looked at in its 
entirety and in accordance with its purpose. All of its parts 
should be given effect insofar as that is possible." Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake Citv, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
890180-CA 2 
We disagree with the trial court's legal conclusion that the 
contract in this case is unambiguous. Paragraph 16 acknowledges 
the refund provision of Paragraph 13, while at the same-time 
imposing a penalty that arguably disregards Paragraph 13. A 
plain reading of the contract does not indicate whether Min 
accordance with" Paragraph 13 controls over the contract being 
"subject to* the additional provisions of Paragraph 16. Nor does 
a plain reading lead to the sure conclusion that Motor Cargo 
would give up the premium refund plus pay a penalty rather than 
being subject to the more customary trade penalty of ten percent. 
Extrinsic evidence may be admitted to construe 
contract. See 50 W. Broadway Assoc. 784 P.2d at 1 
699 P.2d at 716. This contract's ambiguity require 
evidence in order for the contract to be properly i 
The court received such extrinsic evidence and refe 
the findings. Such evidence showed that the partie 
the provisions at issue prior to entering into th£ 
that they knew the excess premium refund would b& 1 
event of cancellation by Motor Cargo. We therefore 
trial court correctly admitted extrinsic evidenced 
and, under the standard set forth in Kimball,1 well 
court's findings of fact undisturbed. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
an -ambiguous 
171? Kimball, 
s extrinsic 
nterpreted. 
rs to it in 
s discussed 
agreement and 
ost in the 
hold that the 
n this case 
eave the 
CONCUR: 
Juditljjfl. Billings, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
1. M[I]f the contract is not an integration or is ambiguous and 
the trial court proceeds to find facts respecting the intentions 
of the parties based on extrinsic evidence, then our review is 
strictly limited." Kimball, 699 P.2d at 716. 
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Jay D. Gurmankin - 1275 
Christopher M. Mislow - 4189 
GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX & BEKDINGER 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a ) 
corporation ) 
vs. 
MOTOR 
Plaintiff, ) 
CARGO, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
Defendant. ) 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 34602 
The parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the 
motion of the plaintiff to strike the affidavit of William K. 
Maxwell dated July 15, 1986, filed in support of the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment and the defendant's 
motion to amend its counterclaim came on regularly for hearing 
on Tuesday, December 2, 1986, at the hour of 11:00 a.m. before 
the Honorable Rodney S. Page, one of the judges in the 
above-entitled Court. Harold C. Verhaaren of Larsen, Mazuran & 
Verhaaren appeared for the plaintiff. Jay D. Gurmankin of 
Giauque & Williams appeared for the defendant. The Court, 
having considered the argument of counsel, the memoranda of 
points and authorities on file herein and the affidavits 
FILMED 
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supporting said motions, and being fully advised in the 
premises, herewith 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. The plaintifffs Motion for Summary Judgment as to 
the First Cause of Action of its complaint is granted, and the 
plaintiff is awarded judgment against the defendant on that 
cause of action in the sum of $70,964.00, plus interest thereon 
commencing as of the entry of this Order; the amount of such 
interest, however, shall not be determined until the 
defendant's Amended Counterclaim is adjudicated, and, at such 
time, the interest on the plaintiffs First Cause of Action 
shall be computed by multiplying the legal rate of 10 percent 
(10%) per annum times the amount by which $70,964,00 exceeds 
the amount of the defendant's recovery on its Amended 
Counterclaim or set-off by way of defenses, if any. Execution 
shall not issue hereon until the claims contained in the 
plaintiff's Second Cause of Action and the defendant's Answer 
and Amended Counterclaim are adjudicated by the Court. The 
amount of attorney's fees, if any, to be awarded is also 
reserved until that time. 
2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment with 
respect to its Second Cause of Action is denied. 
3. The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
denied. 
4. The plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of 
William K. Maxwell dated July 15, 1986, is granted as to those 
portions of paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 7 of said affidavit which 
-2-
3042w 
contain henjfsay and the opinions of William K. Maxwell and 
James Reddington* 
5. The defendant may amend its Counterclaim to 
assert additional claims for intentional interference with the 
defendant's business relationships only. The defendant is 
ordered to file its Amended Counterclaim within ten (10) days 
following the date of the entry of this Order, and the 
plaintiff shall file its response to the Amended Counterclaim 
within ten (10) days after the Amended Counterclaim is filed 
and served upon the plaintiff's attorneys of record. 
DATED this AS^day of February, 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
LARSEN, MAZURAN & VERHAAREN 
^Farola c. Verhaaren 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX & BENDINGER 
By LA^irJilLUJL 
Jay D. Gdrmankin 
L 
Christopher M. Mislow 
Attorneys for Defendant 
3042w 
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HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3326 
MARK P. BELL - 4536 
MAZURAB, VERHAAREH & HAYES, P.C. p« f£P. t !^  ^  8 57 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Parkview Plata, Suite 260 
2180 South 1300 Bast 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-6161 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND POR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 — -
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, » 
a corporation, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
t CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
t Civil No. 34602 
MOTOR CARGO, a Utah 
corporation, : Judge Rodney S. Page 
Defendant. t 
000O000 
All issues in this proceeding not heretofore resolved by 
the Order and Judgment of the Court dated February 25, 1987, 
excepting those claims asserted in the defendant's Amended 
Counterclaim for trade liable and interference with contract and 
business advantage, were submitted to the Court for separate trial 
and judgment pursuant to Rules 39(b) and 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure based upon the parties' Motions, the stipulated 
facts contained in the parties' Stipulation dated December 16, 
1987, (the "Stipulation"), and upon the Affidavits and Memoranda 
submitted in support of their respective positions. The Court 
FILMED 
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thereafter entered its written Memorandum Decision dated May 20, 
1988, its written Supplemental Ruling dated July 27, 1988, and its 
oral ruling on January 3, 1989. Further, in accordance with the 
parties' Stipulation of Dismissal dated December 14, 1988, the 
Court entered its Order dated December 29, 1988, dismissing the 
defendant's Amended Counterclaim. The Court, now being fully 
advised in the premises, herewith enters its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff, Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE") at 
all times material to its Complaint in this matter was duly 
licensed to conduct the business of an insurer in the State of 
Utah. 
2. The defendant Motor Cargo, a Utah corporation 
("Motor Cargo-) at all times material to TIE'S Complaint 
maintained its principal place of business in North Salt Lake, 
Davis County, State of Utah. 
3. Pursuant to the application of Motor Cargo and the 
terms of an agreement between the parties dated March 1, 1979, 
designated as "Retrospective Premium Determination 
Agreement—Plan IIIM (MRetro Agreement—A"), TIE issued its 
policy of insurance No. 6120-00-40 (the "Policy") to Motor Cargo 
having an effective date of March 1, 1979. A copy of Retro 
Agreement—A is attached to the parties' Stipulation as 
Exhibit "0." 
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4. From March 1# 1979 to March 1, 1982, the term of the 
Retro Agreement—A and the Policy, TIE provided insurance coverage 
to Motor Cargo* 
5. At the request of Motor Cargo, the Policy was 
renewed for an additional three-year period beginning on March 1, 
1982, and a second Retrospective Premium Determination 
Agreement—Plan III (-Retro Agreement—B") was executed by the 
parties. A copy of Retro Agreement—B is attached to the parties' 
Stipulation as Exhibit "P." 
6. The second agreement, Retro Agreement—B# signed 
March 2, 1982, was identical to Retro Agreement—A except for 
certain percentage changes in the definition portion of Retro 
Agreement—B. 
7. The Retro Agreements generally provide for a basic 
premium which Motor Cargo was required to pay on a monthly basis, 
but which allow adjustments to that premium by way of additional 
payments by Motor Cargo or credits or refunds to Motor Cargo for 
any excess payments, 
8. The Retro Agreements and the Policy are somewhat 
unique to TIE and allowed Motor Cargo a much broader insurance 
coverage at substantial savings over a standard or fixed-rate 
policy conditioned upon Motor Cargo's loss history and the extent 
to which Motor Cargo is determined to be self insuring. 
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9. Retrospective rating under the Retro Agreements 
provides a method of determining, in retrospect, what the final 
earned premium for the Policy will be for the agreed term of the 
Policy. 
10. Under retrospective rating, the final earned premium 
is determined by considering a number of factors, including the 
amount of losses an insured sustains, administrative costs, 
expenses for adjusting claims, and applicable premium taxes in 
accordance with the agreed formula. 
11. Determining premiums retrospectively in the manner 
set forth in the Retro Agreements benefits an insured by allowing 
it the option of partial self-insurance, and because of the 
retrospective retention, of achieving broader insurance coverage 
at a substantially reduced cost compared to the premium for similar 
coverage under a standard policy. 
12. The benefits and potential savings to the insured 
are dependent upon the insured's loss experience over the agreed 
term, as retrospective rating is designed to recognize the merits 
of each individual risk based upon the loss experience of the 
insured. Each insured develops its own record with respect to the 
premium to be paid at the end of the agreed term. 
13. A substantial part of the consideration to TIE in 
entering into the Retro Agreements with Motor Cargo was the 
agreement of Motor Cargo to continue insurance coverage in force 
for the specified term of three (3) years rather than the one-year 
terra of a standard policy. 
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14. Paragraph 16 of the Retro Agreements provides for 
cancellation by either party upon thirty (30) days written notice 
and that the premium upon cancellation prior to the end of the 
three-year term would be computed in accordance with other terms 
of the agreement, subject to certain additional provisions 
depending upon whether the insured, Motor Cargo, or the insurer, 
TIE, cancelled. 
15. Paragraph 16 also provides, among other things, that 
if the insured, Motor Cargo, cancelled the Policy, that the minimum 
earned premium would be 110% of the Retrospective Premium or of the 
Basic Premium, whichever was greater. 
16. The cancellation provision was specifically 
explained to an officer of Motor Cargo when the Retro Agreement was 
entered into, that is, that in the event of cancellation of the 
Policy before the three (3) year term ended, Motor Cargo would lose 
the benefits of retrospective rating. 
17. In a written notice dated February 28, 1983, Motor 
Cargo properly gave notice to TIE to cancel all insurance policies 
then in effect between Motor Cargo and TIE, including the Policy. 
18. In accordance with that notice, TIE cancelled the 
Policy as of February 28, 1983. 
19. In accordance with the provisions of the Retro 
Agreements, following the cancellation of the Policy, and after 
making various accounting adjustments, TIE sent Motor Cargo its 
final invoice showing a premium due of $68,394.00, which included 
a sum equal to 110% of the greater of the Basic Premium or the 
5 
Retrospective Premium due on Retro Agreement—B, but which gave 
Motor Cargo no credit for any excess premium which it claims was 
due it. 
20. Motor Cargo is indebted to TIE for insurance 
coverage provided under the Policy and the Retro Agreements in the 
principal sum of $68,394.00, plus accruing interest. 
21. Motor Cargo is entitled to the award of reasonable 
attorney's fees. 
22. While all time claimed by TIE'S attorney was 
actually spent in prosecuting TIE'S claims against Motor Cargo, the 
rate charged was reasonable# and the issues, though limited, were 
complex and difficult, some items could have been handled by an 
associate in TIE'S law firm or by a clerk at a lesser hourly rate, 
even though that decision was ultimately for TIE'S counsel to make 
and even though the Court, were he a practicing attorney, would 
personally feel more comfortable handling those items. 
Accordingly, the attorney's fee requested by TIE'S attorney should 
be reduced to $14,500, a reasonable fee under the circumstances. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
herewith enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In the first instance, the Court is required to look 
to the terms of the contract and their plain meaning on questions 
of interpretation. Only when the Court finds the contract to be 
ambiguous or inconsistent may it turn to the general rules of 
construction, i.e. favoring specific provisions over general, 
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first dated provisions over later, and construction against the 
scrivener. 
2. The Retro Agreements entered into by the parties on 
March 1, 1979 and on March 1, 1982, are identical with the 
exception of some percentage changes in the definition paragraph 
of the agreement entered into on March 1, 1982. 
3. The definition portion of the Retro Agreements 
defines the terms "Basic Premium" and "Retrospective Premium." 
4. Paragraph 4(b) of Retro Agreement—B (the "Agreement") 
defines the basic premium as being 76.42% of the Standard Premium. 
Paragraph 4(a) defines the "Standard Premium" as the premium 
established in the Policy. 
5. Paragraph 4(f) of the Agreement defines "Retrospective 
Premium" as: 
"The earned premium according to this agreement, 
computed as the sum of Incurred Losses, plus Service 
Fee# plus Premium Taxes, in no event to exceed the 
Standard Premium." 
6. Paragraph 12 of the Agreement specifically provides 
how the Retrospective Premium is to be computed. 
7. Paragraph 13 of the Agreement provides for 
adjustments to the premium for any excess premium under certain 
circumstances• 
8. Paragraph 16 of the Agreement provides, among other 
things, that either party may cancel on thirty (30) days written 
notice and that the premium for cancellation prior to the end of 
the term shall be computed in accordance with the other provisions 
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of the Agreement, subject to the additional provisions in Paragraph 
16. 
9. One of the additional provisions of Paragraph 16 
provides, in part, that if the insured cancels, the minimum 
earned premium shall be 110% of the Retrospective or Basic 
Premium, whichever is greater. 
10. The Agreement specifically defines Basic Premium 
and Retrospective Premium and the sianner of their calculation. Any 
adjustments thereto provided in the Agreement are not included in 
the definition of those terms nor in their calculation. 
11. Paragraph 16 specifically makes any manner of 
calculation in the Agreement subject to the provisions of 
subparagraph 16(a) which specifically establishes the minimum 
earned premium upon cancellation at 110% of the Retrospective 
Premium or Basic Premium, whichever is greater. This paragraph 
makes no mention of any adjustments to these calculations, nor 
that there is to be a penalty of 10% of any premium so adjusted. 
12. Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that 
the Agreement under its terms is clear and unambiguous and that the 
earned premium on cancellation by the insured, Motor Cargo, is 
equal to 110% of the Basic Premium or Retrospective Premium, 
whichever is greater, as calculated pursuant to Paragraphs 4, 
subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c); Paragraph 12, and Paragraph 16 of 
the Agreement. 
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13. The Basic Premium at the time of the cancellation 
was $139,600.00 and the Retrospective Premium at that time was 
$82,669.00. 
14. Motor Cargo has paid no excess premiums, and thus 
is entitled to no credit for excess premiums as it contends. 
15. TIE is entitled to judgment on its Second Cause of 
Action against Motor Cargo for the sum of $13,960.00, i.e. 10% of 
the Basic Premium of $139,600.00, less a credit of $16,530.00 due 
the defendant as shown on TIE'S final invoice with the difference 
between those sums, namely $2,570.00 to be allowed as a credit 
against the principal amount of $70,964.00 awarded against Motor 
Cargo in the Summary Judgment dated February 25, 1987, on TIE'S 
First Cause of Action, leaving a total principal amount owed by 
Motor Cargo to TIE on both causes of action of $68,394.00. 
16. Because Motor Cargo's Amended Counterclaim has been 
dismissed and it is entitled to recover nothing thereby or by way 
of setoff or defenses in accordance with Paragraph 1 of the Summary 
Judgment dated February 25, 1987, TIE is entitled to accruing 
interest on the sum of $68,394.00 at the rate of 10% per annum from 
February 25, 1988r until judgment is entered based upon the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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17. In addition, and as part of the judgment, Motor 
Cargo should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees amounting to 
$14,500.00 and its costs incurred herein amounting to $60.00* 
LET JUDGMEKT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
DATED this _£__ day of ~^k . 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed 
by the law firm of MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C., Parkview 
Plaza, Suite 260, 2180 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah and 
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5 Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a true copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law was caused to be served upon: 
Jay D. Gurmankin 
Giague & Williams 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
by hand-delivery this V^ day of January, 1989. 
fr^i 
^ 
-^k^W^vy-
tie.m-fndcl 
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HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3326 
MARK F. BELL - 4536 
KAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HATES, P-C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Parkview Plaza, Suite 260 
2180 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-6161 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, : 
a corporation, 
i JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
: 
vs. 
: Civil No. 34602 
MOTOR CARGO, a Utah 
corporation, : Judge Rodney S. Page 
Defendant. : 
oooOooo 
All issues in this proceeding not heretofore resolved by 
the Order and Judgment of the Court dated February 25, 1987, 
excepting those claims asserted in the defendant's Amended 
Counterclaim for trade liable and interference with contract and 
business advantage, were submitted to the Court for separate trial 
and judgment pursuant to Rules 39(b) and 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure based upon the parties' Motions, the stipulated 
facts contained in the parties' Stipulation dated December 16, 
1987, and upon the Affidavits and Memoranda submitted in support 
of their respective positions. The Court thereafter entered its 
JU06MENT ENTERED FILMED 
BY „,, *MP) v * APPENDIX - Pa r t D 
written Memorandum Decision dated May 20, 1988, its vrritten 
Supplemental Ruling dated July 27, 1988, and its oral ruling on 
January 3, 1989• Further, in accordance with the parties' 
Stipulation of Dismissal dated December 14, 1988, the Court entered 
its Order dated December 29, 1988, dismissing the defendant's 
Amended Counterclaim, The Court, having also made and entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, herewith 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that the plaintiff do have 
and recover judgment against the defendant on the First and Second 
Causes of Action of the plaintiff's Complaint in the principal sum 
of Sixty-eight Thousand Three Hundred Ninety-four Dollars 
($68,394.00), accruing interest on that sum at the rate of ten 
percent (10%) per annum or $18.74 per day from February 25, 1988, 
until the date hereof, a reasonable attorney's fee of Fourteen 
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($14,500.00), and costs of $60.00, 
together with interest on the total judgment at the rate of 12% per 
annum from the date hereof until paid in full. 
This Judgment supersedes the Order and Judgment of the 
Court dated February 5, 1987. 
DATED this l3^day of UJo . 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOHORABLfi RODNEY S4 PAGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
District/Court Judge 
GURMANKIN 
Attorney for Defendant 
CEmriCATg Of SBRVICg 
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed 
by the law firm of MAZURAN, VERHAAREN k HATES, P.C., Parkview 
Plaza, Suite 260, 2180 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah and 
that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5 Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a true copy of the foregoing Judgment was caused to be 
served upon: 
Jay D- Gurmankin 
Giaque 6 Williams 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
by first-class mail on this 2- day of February, 1989. 
tie.m-order 
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GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX 
Si BENDINGER 
Jay D. Gurmankin 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v* 
MOTOR CARGO, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATION 
Civil No. 34602 
The plaintiff, Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE"), by 
and through its attorneys of record, Mazuran, Verhaaren & 
Hayes, P.C., and the defendant, Motor Cargo, a Utah corporation 
(-Motor Cargo"), by and through its attorneys of record, 
Giauque, Williams, Wilcox & Bendinger, herewith stipulate and 
agree as follows: 
1. The issues in this proceeding not heretofore 
resolved by the Order and Judgment of the Court dated February 
25, 1987, other than Motor Cargo's claims for trade liable and 
interference with contract and business advantage, are herewith 
APPENDIX - Part E 
submitted to the Court for trial and judgment pursuant to Rules 
39(b) and 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, based upon the 
Motions, Memoranda and Affidavits supporting and opposing 
summary judgment previously submitted, and upon the facts 
stipulated below. For the Courtfs convenience, said Motions, 
Memoranda and Affidavits, and the Judgment and Order of the 
Court, are attached hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibits 
-A" through "N". 
2. Motor Cargo's claims for trade liable and 
interference with contract and business advantages are severed 
pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and trial on 
those claims is hereby deferred to a date to be set in the 
future. 
3« The following facts are stipulated for the 
purposes of trial and the Court is to determine the other facts 
based on the memoranda, affidavits and exhibits previously 
referred to: 
(a) TIE is and at all times material to its 
Complaint in this matter was duly licensed to conduct the 
business of an insurer in the State of Utah. 
(b) Motor Cargo at all times material to TIE'S 
Complaint maintained its principal place of business in North 
Salt Lake, Davis County, State of Utah. 
(c) Pursuant to the application of Motor Cargo 
and the terms of an agreement between the parties dated 
March 1, 1979, designated as -Retrospective Premium 
2499J -2-
Determination Agreement ~ Plan III- (-Retro-Agreement—A"), 
TIE issued its policy of insurance No. 6120-00-40 (the 
-Policy-) to Motor Cargo having an effective date of March 1, 
1979. A copy of Retro Agreement—A is attached hereto as 
Exhibit -0-. 
(d) From March 1, 1979 to March 1, 1982, the 
term of Retro Agreement—A and the Policy, the plaintiff 
provided insurance coverage for Motor Cargo. 
(e) At the request of Motor Cargo, the Policy 
was renewed for an additional three-year period beginning on 
March 1, 1982 and a second Retrospective Premium Determination 
Agreement—Plan III (-Retro Agreement—B*) was executed by the 
parties. A copy of Retro Agreement—B is attached hereto as 
Exhibit -P-. 
(f) One year later, on or about February 28, 
1983, Motor Cargo gave the plaintiff written notice to cancel 
all insurance policies then in effect between Motor Cargo and 
TIE, including the Policy. 
(g) In accordance with Motor Cargo's Notice of 
Cancellation, TIE cancelled the Policy effective February 28, 
1983. 
(h) A copy of the final "Retrospective Premium 
Reports- dated September 30, 1985 is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"Q-. 
4. Attorneys* Fees, if any are awarded by the Court, 
may be proved in accordance with Rule 10 of the Rules of 
2499j -3-
Practice of this Court, or in such other manner as the Court 
may order. . 
Dated this /&? day of December, 1987. 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
TRUCK 
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RETROSPECTIVE 
PREMIUM 
DETERMINATION 
AGREEMENT 
A 
PLANM 
^ 
WHEREAS the TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, hereinafter called the 'ExehonaV hat issued o certoin 
policy of insurance to 
Motor Cargo 
hereinafter called the 'insured" and 
WHEREAS the Exchonge and the Insured desire to determine ond adjust the earned premium upon such 
policy as herein provided, 
NOW, T H E R E F O R E , in consideration of the payment of the premium provided for in said policy ond the 
mutual acceptance of the terms set forth herein, the parties agree as follows: 
1 . PERIOD OF AGREEMENT. This agreement shod take effect ****** 1 , 1 1 1 2 
ond shall terminate M i r C h 1 , I t t S 
of 12:01 A.M. Stondord Time at the principal office of the Insured as of each of said dotes, unless 
terminated eoriier by the cancellation of said policy or as provided hereinafter in this agreement, 
2. INSURANCE POLICY. This agreement shal l apply t o p * l i r y o U 1 0 ^ 0 0 - 4 0 ^ t k « tamed premium 
on such policy shall be utilized in computing the earned premium under this agreement. The term 
"Pol icy" shall include 'pol icies' when there are more than one subject to this agreement. 
3 . ACCIDENT REPORTS. The Insured ogrees to report to the Exchange as soon as procticoble a l l 
accidents or losses insured under said policy. 
4 . DEFIN IT IONS. For the purpose of this agreement the words and phrases set forth below shall be 
defined as follows: 
(a) STANDARD PREMIUM - The premium computed in accordance with the provisions of the policy, 
other than this agreement. 
(b) BASIC PREMIUM - f y n t y ^ t i T mnA 4 1 / 1 0 0 
of tr*t Standard Premium. 
tAftft-
„p*r cent ( 7 € » 4 2 % ) 
.per cent (10 • O O I ) 
to/ioo .percent 1 3 , S O ! ) 
(c) RETROSPECTIVE SURCHARGE -_ 
of the Basic Premium. 
(d) SERVICE FEE -
of the Basic Premium. 
(e) PREMIUM TAXES - The amount of premium taxes required to be paid to any stateondother 
governmental bodies on such portion of the premium earned on this policy that is subject to 
adjustment by thie agreement. 
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(f) RETROSPECTIVE PREMIUM - The earned premium according to this ogreement, computed a% 
the sum of the Incurred Losses plus Service Fee , plus Premium Taxes, in no event to exceed the 
Standard Premium. 
{g) INCURRED LOSSES - The sum of: 
(1) Actual losses paid by the Exchange, including loss adjustment expense, and 
(2) Reserves as estimated by the Exchange to liquidate unpaid losses and loss adjustment 
expense on claims reported to the Exchange, and 
(3) Reserves as estimated by the Exchange for orvpartmi losses and loss adjustment expense. 
(h) RETROSPECTIVE RETENTION - For purposes of premium determination in accordance with 
this agreement, the aggregate of actual paid losses and reserves for unpaid losses arising out 
of any single occurrence or accident chargeable to "Incurred Losses* shall not exceed 
I l Q r Q Q Q which sum shall be defined as the "Retrospective Retention". No Adjustment 
Expense shall be included in determining the amount of any loss for purposes of the Retro* 
spective Retention. 
(i) ADJUSTMENT EXPENSE - There will be two types of loss adjustment expense,which shall 
be defined and computed as follows. 
(1) Allocated Adjustment Expense - Exact items of expense directly incurred by the Exchange 
and chargeable to a particular claim. (Examples: Legal fees, court costs, medical examiner's 
fees, photographer bi l ls, independent adjusters, etc.) 
(2) Unallocated Adjustment Expense - A charge to cover all general claims administration costs. 
(Examples: Services of salaried adjusters, claims examiners, clerical service, stationery, 
office rent, and other overhead items). The charge to h» 1 7 % of al l paid Bodily Injury 
Liability claims and 0 % of all other paid claims. 
5. DISTRIBUTION OF ADJUSTMENT EXPENSE. A l l Adjustment Expense shall be chargeable to 
incurred Losses, except that, if the amount of loss from any single occurrence or accident exceeds the 
amount of the Retrospective Retention, 
(o) Allocated Adjustment Expense shall be charged to Incurred Losses in the same proportion that 
the Retrospective Retention bears to the total amount of the loss; and 
(b) No Unallocated Adjustment Expense shall be charged on that portion of any such loss in excess 
of the Retrospective Retention. 
6. PREMIUM PAYMENT. Premium for the policy subject to this agreement shall be paid in monthly 
installments and, initially, at the Basic rate. Once each month following the first thirty-day period of 
this agreement a ratio shall be calculated between Incurred Losses, as defined herein, and the 
premium charged, less premium refunds. As long as the loss ratio so calculated remains ot 7 f t °Z> 
or less, premium shall continue to be paid at the Basic rate. 
7. C O L L E C T I O N OF RETROSPECTIVE SURCHARGE. At any such monthly calculation if the loss 
ratio so derived shall exceed _JUfe, the Insured shall pay upon demand the difference between premium 
paid for the preceding period or periods and an amount sufficient to bring the loss ratio to . 
not to exceed the Standard Premium for the period this agreement has been in farce; and shall pay 
premium for succeeding monthly periods at the Standard rote, but only as long as the loss ratio ex-
ceeds J t i _ % . 
POAffl 
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8. SUSPENSION OF RETROSPECTIVE SURCHARGE. If, «t ony monthly calculation, the loss ratio 
. aholt fafl below_JJL3# *** B°**c rate'shall be reinstated and the preceding provisions shall 
apply ae frees the beginning. Any suspension of collection shall not constitute o woiver of the 
right to collect the Retrospective Surcharge so suspended; but the suspension shall act only o% 
a postponement of billing until such time as the Surcharge may be required. 
9. INTERIM ACCOUNTING. The Exchange shall moke a preliminary accounting to the Insured as of 
the end of the 12-month and 24-month periods of this agreement and at these times, if the Retro-
elective Premium is lets than the total premium paid, the Exchange shall credit up to f f per-
eent of the difference to the account of the Insured or will refund up to^JUL-percent of such dif-
ference at these tieies to the Insured; at such t ie* and in the manner requested. 
10. MINIMUM PREMIUM. The minimum earned premium for the period of this agreement sholl not be less 
than the Service Fee plus Premium Taxes. 
11. MAXIMUM PREMIUM. The maximum earned premium for the period of this agreement shall not exceed 
the Standard Premium. 
12. COMPUTATION OF PREMIUM. The Retrospective Premium shall be computed as follows: 
(a) As of sixty days after the termination of the agreement the Exchange shall moke the initial 
computation of the earned premium. 
Cb) At intervals of six storrths, twelve months, twentyfour months and thirty-six months after the 
termination of the agreement the Exchange shall recompute the Retrospective Premium on the 
basts of the Exchange's determination of the amount of Incurred Losses. 
(c) The Retrospective Premium determined by the fifth recomputotion sholl be the final earned 
prmmium for the policy. 
(d) Final computation may be mode at any date prior or subsequent to thirty-six months after term-
ination of the agreement, by written ogreement between the insured and Exchange. 
13. ADJUSTMENT OF PREMIUM. After computing the Retrospective Premium at the 60-day, 6-month, 
12-month, 24-month, and 36-morrrh periods, ond provided the Retrospective Premium for the term 
of this ogreement is less than all premium paid to the Exchange upon said policy, the Exchange 
shall, after each such computation, credit the excess premium paid to subsequent policies issued 
to or subsequent premium determination agreement entered into with the Insured, or refund such 
excess premium to the Insured at such time ond in the manner requested, provided any refund made 
on the initial accounting shall be limited to not more than JUL—.oercent of the indicated excess 
premium. 
14. REIMBURSEMENT BY INSURED. Upon the making of any settlement prior to the finol settlement, if 
the Retrospective Premium on subsequent premium determination is greater than the Retrospective 
Premium developed on the last settlement date, the insured will pay to the Exchange, upon demand, 
the amount of the difference between the newry developed Retrospective Premium ond the Retro-
spective Premium developed on the last settlement date. 
15. PREMIUM COLLECTION. The named insured agrees to pay all reasonable collect, on costs, in-
cluding reasonable attorney's fees and court costs, incurred in collecting ony premiums or other 
sums due the Exchange under this ogreement. 
16* CANCELLATION. This ogreemertt may be cancelled by the Insured, or by the Exchange, at any time, 
by giving tfeirty days 00 ) advance written notice to the other party. The Exchange may cancel the 
agreement because of non-payment of premium by giving ten days (10) advance written notice to the 
Ineured. The prmmwm for a -cancellation prior to the end of the term of this agre^mmnt sholl be 
computed in accordance with the other provisions of this agreement, subject to the following 
additional provisions. 
(a) Cancellation by the named Insured* 
in ^>feni of cancellation by the named insured for any other reason, the minimum earned premium 
shall be 110% of the Retrospective or Basic Premium, whichever is the greater, but the amount 
so calculated shall not exceed the Standard Premium as defined in this agreement, provided, 
however, that if tne insured order• cancellation of this agreement within sixty days following 
the effective data of any rate increase in any of the policies of insurance applicable to this 
agreement, or the business entity is dissolved, the earned premium shall be the Retrospective 
Premium. 
(b) Cancellation by the Exchange: 
In the event of cancellation by the Exchange, the earned premium shall be the Retrospective 
Premium. A cancellation for non-payment of premium shall be considered to be a cancellation 
by the named insured, in which case the provisions of paragraph 16 (a), as stated above, shall 
apply. 
17. POLICY CONDITIONS. Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to supersede, modify or amend 
ony of the terms or conditions of the policies of insurance issued to the Insured and referred to 
herein, except as respects the determination of the amount and method of premium payable as 
orovided for tn this agreement. 
Executed - »«* i»*m11«% f Tflmhft Date 2 - B - B 2 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE 
Truck Underwriters Asaociattol), Attorney • in -Fact 
MGIOMAL MANAGE* 
Accepted 
PDA ]B 
^ M M I M 1.77 
••• €#• "S 
HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3325 
MARK F. BELL - 4536 
LARSEN, MAZURAN AND VERHAAREN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
100 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, OT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-3500 
m
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOTOR CARGO, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF WENDELL WELLS 
Civil No. 34602 
oooOooo 
STATE OF UTAH 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Wendell Wells, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. All matters stated herein are based upon my personal 
knowledge and information. 
2. I am personally acquainted with the account of the 
defendant Motor Cargo (Motor Cargo) with the plaintiff Truck 
Insurance Exchange (TIE) and negotiated the sale of insurance to 
-1-
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Motor Cargo pursuant to the term of TIE'S Retrospective Premium 
Determination Agreement ("Retro Agreement"), a copy of which is 
attached to the plaintiff's Complaint as Exhibit A and by 
reference made a part hereof. 
3. At that time# I was the manager for TIE of its 
national accounts and special lines. 
4. On behalf of TIE, I entered into preliminary 
discussions with representatives of Motor Cargo regarding the 
execution of the Retro Agreement. I explained the contents of 
the Retro Agreement to the defendant's representatives and in 
particular hov; the cancellation provisions of the Retro Agreement 
in Paragraph 16 would be applied. 
5. The name of one of Motor Cargo's representatives 
with whom the preliminary discussions and negotiations were 
entered into and to whom those explanations were made was 
Lawrence J. Ranck, who indicated that he was Motor Cargo's vice 
president. 
6. Before the Retro Agreement was executed by Motor 
Cargo, I explained to Mr. Ranckf among other things, that the 
retrospective rating was a method of determining, in retrospect, 
what the final earned premium for a policy of title insurance 
would be for the agreed three-year term of the policy, and that 
all interim refunds and premium adjustments were subject to a 
final adjustment and settlement at the end of the agreed three-
year term of the Retro Agreement* I also explained to them that 
if the agreements were terminated by Motor Cargo before the end 
of the three-year terraf that the provisions of Paragraph 16 of 
the Retro Agreement would apply and that the premium then due 
would be the greater of the retrospective or basic premium com-
puted under the terms of the policy plus a ten percent (10%) 
short-range cancellation charge, and that Motor Cargo would lose 
the benefits of retrospective rating. 
7. After I made the foregoing explanations and the 
Retro Agreement was executed by Motor Cargo, a number of interim 
refunds were made to Motor Cargo, the receipt of which was 
acknowledged by Lawrence J. Ranck, who further acknowledged the 
refunds were subject to adjustments and final settlement on the 
final settlement date. Copies of those letters acknowledging the 
interim nature of those refunds are attached hereto as "Exhibit 
A", "Exhibit B", "Exhibit C", "Exhibit D", "Exhibit E", "Exhibit 
F", "Exhibit G", "Exhibit H." A letter signed by Hal R. Tate to 
that same affect is also attached hereto as "Exhibit I." 
DATED this / '').ci- day of September, 1986. 
WENDELL TOLLS 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this IJ - day of 
September, 1986* 
cmSM^^^^-
My Commission Expires: Residing at: 
J V ' CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this f/L-day of September, 
1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit 
of Wendell Wells to Jay D. Gurmankin, attorney for defendant, 500 
Kearns Building, 136 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84101. 
/• fe^/^/A-
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GIAUQUE & WILLIAMS 
Jay D. Gurmankin (#1275) 
Christopher M. Mislow (#4189) 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, A 
CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOTOR CARGO, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
WILLIAM K. MAXWELL, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. I am a full-time licensed insurance agent, and am 
the owner of Mountain States Insurance in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. I began my insurance career with Transport Insurance, a 
specialist in trucking insurance. Since December 1984, I have 
represented Farmers Insurance Group and its subsidiaries, 
including Truck Insurance Exchange ("TIE"). I am therefore not 
only familiar with trucking insurance in general, but have 
become particularly familiar with the retrospective premium 
agreements issued by TIE, including both the agreements 
FILMED 
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WILLIAM K. MAXWELL 
Civil No. 34602 
themselves and the manner in which premiums are calculated 
thereunder. 
2. In February 1983, at the request of Harold R. 
Tate, the president of Motor Cargo, I reviewed in detail the 
Retrospective Premium Determination Agreement executed by TIE 
and Motor Cargo on March 1, 1982 ("Retro Agreement B"), a copy 
of which is attached as Exhibit "B" to the Affidavit :t Paul J. 
Semens. Specifically, Mr. Tate asked me what penalties Motor 
Cargo would be required to pay if it cancelled under paragraph 
16(a) of the Agreement. 
3. It was my opinion that the only reasonable 
interpretation of paragraph 16(a) of Retro Agreement B was that 
Motor Cargo would have to pay 3 10% penalty of either the 
retrospective premium or the basic premium, whichever was 
greater, but that in no event would Motor Cargo forfei t its 
rights to j> refund of excess premiums paid undei pat a graph 13 
of the agreement. I expressed this opinion to Mr. Tate. It 
remains my opinion that the paragraph is poorly worded and that 
a layman reading its language would be easily confused as to 
its meaning. 
4. I also showed Retro Agreement B to James 
Keddington, an agent employed by Diversified Insurance Brokers, 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. Following his review of the 
agreement, he too expressed his opinion that Motor Cargo would 
have to pay at most a 10% penalty under paragraph 16(a). 
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5. Following Motor Cargo's cancellation of Retro 
Agreement B, TIE sent Motor Cargo an invoice (a copy of which 
is attached as Exhibit "D" to the Affidavit of Paul J. Semons) 
which did not reflect excess paid premium credits due to Motor 
Cargo under paragraph 13 of the agteeir.ent. At Mr. Tate's 
request, I dratted a responsive letter dated September 15, 1933 
for his signature, in which I pointed out to TIE that a premium 
refund in the amount of $50,682.00 was owed to Mocoi Cargo. (A 
copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit "E" to the Affidavit 
of Paul J. Semons). 
6. TIE'S premium report dated September 30, 1935 (a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A") reveals that 
Motor Cargo had paid a premium of $139,600.00, and that the 
premium due was $32,669.00. Hence, according to TIE'S records, 
Motor Cargo is entitled to a premium refund of $56,931.00. 
(This refund is greater than the amount claimed in the letter 
which I drafted for Mr. Tate's signature because the reserves 
mentioned at page 5 of the letter had been released, and part 
of the released amounts were credited to Motor Cargo). 
7. It is my understanding from TIE'S report dated 
September 30, 1985 (Exhibit MAM hereto) that the premium of 
$82,669.00 shown thereon as owed to TIE includes the following 
elements: (i) all of TIE'S out-of-pocket expenses, such as paid 
losses and outside adjusting fees; (ii) all of TIE'S allocated 
internal overhead expenses; and (iii) profit, which is built 
into the 13.5% "service fee." Consequently, the $56,931-00 
which TIE is withholding from Motor Cargo is a sum in addition 
to TIE'S expenses, in addition to TIE'S profits on the 
agreement, and in addition to the 10% penalty under paragraph 
15(a). 
DATED this jSm day of July, 1986. 
^M^^rfo 
Wi 11 i am K. Max%>e i 1 
<i 
n SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before :ne this /^ ~"iay of 
July, 1986. 
My Commission Expires ^—--Ittftary Pubii 
Residing at %efVj^Jgjt, -x£u 
24.63m 
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MOTOR CARGO 5TATE_I5__DIST._&3___ AGENT. 
PERIOD OF PREMIUM OETERMINATION AGREEMENT: From ?-l-*2 
RETRO. PLAN III RETRO. SURCHARGE 
3-1-8? 
JJL 
Jo 
.% RETRO.RETENTION * 1 0 . Of 
PLAN TJX LOSS R A T 1 0 _ _ J t 5 _ X (Incurred losses to Total Premium) REPORT AS OF: SCPT 30 * 1985 
Pol.cy Nov > N 0 6 0 1 - 0 0 - 0 3 
PREMIUMS 6 1 2 0 - 0 0 * 4 0 
Estimated Unpaid Premium 
Paid Premium 
AUDIT EARNED PREMIUM 
TOTALS 
NOTE: AN Amounts Rounded TO THE Nearet* 0 
1ASIC SURCHARGE TO 
126,036 
13.56H 
139,600 
126, ( 
13, i 
139, i 
LOSSES INCURRED 
PAIO tosses 
Bodily Injury 
Al l Other 
Less Deductible Recoveries From Insured ( — ) 
toss ttsttves 
Bodily Injury 
Al l Other 
tOSStS INCUmCO SUT WOT HtfOtTtO 
Bodily Injury 
Al l Other 
AUOCATf D AOJUSTMtWT IXPtWSt 
Bodily Iniury Paid 
B. I. Reserve (15% of * 
Al l Other Paid 
UNAUOCATED AOIUSTMIWT gXftNSt 
Bodily Injury 
20,000 
- 0 -
- 0 -
- 0 -
Paid Losses* 
Reserves 
Incurred but not reportedL 
AH Ofht 
Paid Losses* 
Reserves 
Incurred but not reported. 
m U t t D«ftWibU l i M M f i t l 
TOTAL LOSSES INCURRED 
SERVICE PEE: 1 3 . 5 0 
32,976 
- 0 -
20,000 
32,976 
-0-
i
 
i
 
i
 
i 
o
 
o
 o
 
c 
III! 
95 
-0-
«*.166 
20,000 
X17 
32,976 
X8 
52,976 
-0-
«i,261 
_ % 3,*»00 
\ 2.618 
63,275 
TAX MULTIPLIER 1.0 2 3 5 
% of Basic Premium 
TOTAL EARNED PREMIUM (Before Taxes) 
_of Earned Premium
 —
 RETROSPECTIVE PREMIUM S 82„fif 
RETURN PREMIUM ADJUSTMENTS 
excess 
175,79? 
g 187.7<t 
JJlfL 
^ f i q 
LAST FIGURE IN THE RIGHT HAND COLUMN REPRESENTS RETURN PREMIUM ( + ) OR DEFICIT (—) 
| (Subject to payment of estimated unpaid premium) 
RFGIONAI MANACFt OR REGIONAL COMM. MANAGER'S COPY 
HAROLD C. VERHAAREN - 3325 
MARK F. BELL - 4536 
LARSEN, MAZURAN AND VERHAAREN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
100 3oston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-3 500 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
000O000 
TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOTOR CARGO, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
WILLIAM K. MAXWELL 
Civil No. 34602 
000O000 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
William K. Maxwell, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says: 
1. All matters stated in this Supplemental Affidavit 
are based upon my personal knowledge and information. 
2. On July 15, 1986, I signed an affidavit for use in 
the above-captioned proceeding which was prepared by the attor-
neys for the defendant, Motor Cargo, a Utah corporation. 
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3. This affidavit is filed to supplement my July 15, 
1986, affidavit and to clarify certain statements contained in 
that affidavit. 
4. I first became a licensed insurance agent on or 
about June, 1982, and am currently the owner of Mountain States 
Insurance in Salt Lake City, Utah, a company which was first 
formed on or about October 25, 1984. 
5. Although I had seen the retrospective premium deter-
mination agreement of Truck Insurance Exchange (Retro Agreement) , 
the first time that I thoroughly reviewed and studied it was in 
February, 1983, when at the request of Harold R. Tate, the presi-
dent of Motor Cargo, I reviewed the Retro Agreement which had 
been executed by Truck Insurance Exchange and Motor Cargo. 
6. At the time I reviewed and studied the Retro 
Agreement in February, 1983, my then-employer, Transport 
Insurance, was attempting to get the insurance business of Motor 
Cargo that was then being handled by Truck Insurance Exchange. 
7. After Motor Cargo had transferred its insurance 
business from Truck Insurance Exchange to Transport Insurance, I 
agreed to draft a letter datd September 15, 1983, for the signa-
ture of Mr. Tate responding to the payment demand of Truck 
Insurance Exchange. A copy of that letter is attached hereto as 
"Exhibit A." 
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8. At the time I wrote the letter and gave ray opinion 
to Mr. Tatef I had had no experience in actually selling/ ser-
vicing or handling Retro Agreements, but I based my opinion in 
that letter on my study and review of the Retro Agreement and 
upon the opinion of James Keddington, who I believed had had some 
experience in handling Retro Agreements. 
9. At the request of Motor Cargo, I acted on its behalf 
in attempting to negotiate a settlement of Truck Insurance 
Exchange's claim against Motor Cargo for the earned premiums 
which Truck Insurance Exchange claimed Motor Cargo owed to it in 
the Retro Agreement, and I have assisted Motor Cargo in for-
mulating some of its answers to the Interrogatories served upon 
Motor Cargo by Truck Insurance Exchange. 
10. As of the date of this affidavit, I have never sold 
insurance coverage under the terms of a Retro Agreement. 
11. At the time I signed my affidavit on July 15, 1986, 
I was and I continue to be an insurance agent for Motor Cargo, 
handling much of its insurance business. 
DATED this /7r?v day of September, 1986. 
WILLIAM K. MAXWELL/' 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1 -f ^  day of 
September, 1986. 
Nofetry Public J 
Residing at: 
~- vU-yv-v--
VXALC^U 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this Jj( day of September, 
1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Supplemental Affidavit of William K. Maxwell to Jay D. Gurmankin, 
attorney for defendant, 500 Kearns Building, 136 South Main 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101. 
l'W<M^<\ 
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